Little doubt exists to-day that the northern fortifications could not
have resisted a determined attack. That it was not attempted was
another grave error; to be followed by yet another, when, after a
hazardous detour--the well-known "flank march"--the allies transferred
themselves to the southern side of Sebastopol, and again neglected a
palpable opportunity. The north side might be fairly well protected;
the south was practically defenceless; a few weak earth-works,
incomplete, and without artillery, were its only bulwarks; its only
garrison were a few militia battalions and some hastily-formed
regiments of sailors from the now sunken Russian ships of war.
It must undoubtedly have fallen by a _coup de main_. But generals
hesitated and differed, bolder spirits were overruled, undue weight
was given to the too-cautious counsels of scientific soldiers, and it
was decided to sit down before and slowly besiege the place.
The chance on which the allies turned their backs was quickly seized
by the enemy. One of the brightest pages in modern military annals is
that which records how the genius and indomitable energy of one man
improvised a resolute and protracted defence; and none have done
fuller justice to Todleben than the foes he so long and gallantly kept
at bay.
The allies now entered, almost with light hearts, upon a siege that
was to last for eleven weary months and prove the source of unnumbered
woes.
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